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JENNIFER HORNSBY 
 
We know what one dualist account of human action looks like, because Descartes gave us 
one.
1
  I want to explore the extent to which contemporary accounts of physical action are 
vulnerable to the charges that may be made against Descartes’s dualist account.  I have a long-
standing interest in philosophy of action, and have always maintained that my view about the 
basic shape of a correct ‘theory of action’ can be accepted by someone resolutely opposed to 
dualism.  But the genuineness of my opposition has been doubted, and it will remain doubtful 
until we have a better understanding of what makes an account objectionably dualistic.  In this 
paper, I hope to deflect some of the criticisms aimed against my account, and to show that 
when they are turned onto their proper path their actual target is a kind of physicalism.
2
 
 I shall have to rely on one intuitive understanding of physical action here.  According to 
this, where there is a physical action, a person moves, and there is a psychological explanation 
of a certain sort of something that she thereby does.  This takes it for granted that human 
agency is evinced when someone does something intentionally,
3
 and that when people do 
things by moving their bodies, they are involved in events.
4
  Using this conception, and 
assuming a certain account of events’ individuation,5 one can say that any action is some 
person’s moving her body (usually her moving of a bit of it).  This understanding will serve in 
the present context, because the debates about action which are of concern here take place in 
the domain that it carves out.
6
 
                                                 
   
1
 Since delivering the lecture on which the present paper is based, I have come across Descartes’ Dualism, by 
Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris (London: Routledge, 1996), in which the authors argue that Descartes did 
not hold the doctrine (sc. ‘Cartesian Dualism’) which contemporary philosophers attribute to him.  If they are 
right, then we may be less well placed than I suppose to base knowledge of a dualist account of action on our 
understanding of Descartes.  I have responded by adding Appendix B. 
 
   
2
 The account I gave in Actions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) has often been accused of 
Cartesianism:  there are more details in §5, and see note 30 infra. 
 
   
3
 The general idea that human agency is evinced when a person intentionally does something is relatively 
uncontroversial.  It can be sustained by seeing what sort of trio the concepts of belief, desire and intention form, 
and thus what kind of psychological explanation an action explanation is. 
 
   
4
 Some resist the assumption that an action is ever an event.  Resistance may stem from the thought that actions 
should not be reckoned among ‘mere happenings’.  I hope that it will become clear why, on my own view, there 
could be no reason to treat actions as ‘mere happenings’. 
 
   
5
 See e.g. D. Davidson, ‘Agency’, in R. Binkley et al (eds.) Agent, Action and Reason (Toronto: Toronto 
University Press, 1971);  repr.in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 43–61. 
 
   
6
 When actions are defined by reference to a class of physical events, the general idea of human agency is 
restricted in two different ways.  (a) Left out from the account are things that fall into an intuitive category of 
mental.  Consider mental arithmetic;  or consider the view that agency is evinced whenever there is an exercise of 
practical reason.  (b) Left out from the account are things people intentionally do, the doings of which are not 
events.  Consider an occasion on which a intentionally fails to greet b, and on which we might be apt to say that a 
did nothing, or say that nothing happened.  Here a’s intentionally not greeting b may be thought not to be an 
event;  and, if it is not, then we have an example of agency—according to the intuitive conception of agency—, 
but we do not have an action—not according to the restrictive conception of actions.  For present purposes, it need 
not be a question whether restrictions (a) and (b) ought to be lifted by a correct conception of agency, because 
charges of dualism are faced by accounts of action which impose the restrictions and deal with ‘physical actions’. 
 
 2 
1:  Dualism vs. Physicalism 
Before I come to allegations of dualism made against accounts of action, I should say 
something about what dualism itself amounts to.  I think that in the present state of play, many 
philosophers have an inadequate conception of this. 
 Naturally enough, dualism is contrasted with physicalism.
7
  We know that there are 
various versions of physicalism advocated in the philosophy of mind.  For a start, there is the 
mild sort—token–token identities physicalism—, and there is the stronger sort—so called 
type–type identities physicalism.  And then there are versions of physicalism which hold that 
composition or constitution, rather than identity, is the relation holding between mental and 
physical states and events.  Whatever the details, it can seem as if we might put physicalist 
doctrines onto some sort of scale—a scale on which dualism might be supposed to feature at 
the opposite pole, as it were, from the strongest physicalist doctrine.  It seems, then, as though 
we could ask a person:  ‘How physicalist are you?’.  One possible answer would be ‘Not at 
all’;  and then, if this were the right way to think about things, we could place the person as a 
dualist.  But this cannot be the right account of the matter.  If dualists are to be contrasted with 
physicalists, then that is not because they reject rather a lot of the doctrine which we have 
come to associate with ‘physicalism’ at the end of the twentieth century.  Dualists are 
distinguished from physicalists inasmuch as a dualist answers Two to a certain question, to 
which any monist—including a physicalist—answers One.  The question to which Descartes’s 
answer of Two earns him the title of dualist is the question ‘How many sorts of substance 
inhabit the world?’. 
 Not only is he a dualist, but also (what matters here) Descartes’s account of action is 
dualistic in a straightforward and obvious sense.  It is true that when res cogitans first appears 
in the Second Meditation, ‘it is in the strict sense only a thing that thinks’:  ‘I am a mind or 
intelligence or intellect or reason’, Descartes says.  But Descartes widens ‘thought’ to include 
volitional, as well as intellectual, activity.  ‘What is a thing that thinks?’, he asks;  and answers 
‘A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing or is unwilling’.8  Volitions—in 
which a res cogitans participates insofar as it ‘is willing’—belong to substances which are 
entirely separate, and radically different in their nature, from any bodies. 
 Let us call such substances ‘souls’.9  Then one disavows dualism of Descartes’s sort by 
saying that there are no such things as souls.  In that case there cannot be any need to locate 
oneself on any scale of ‘physicalism’ in order to avoid dualism.  But by the same token, there 
must be more to Descartes’s way of thinking about persons than is elicited in contrasting it 
with contemporary physicalists’ ways of thinking.  We are often encouraged to think that 
‘Cartesianism’ still rears its ugly head.  From a variety of sources, we are familiar with attacks 
on the idea of mental states as inner, private states, whose content can be specified without 
                                                 
   
7
 Throughout, I use ‘physicalism’ as the name of a kind of monism.  I might have used the word ‘materialism’, 
or, introducing another bone of contention, ‘naturalism’, instead. 
 
   
8
 My italics.  Descartes actually adds imagining and having sensory perceptions onto this list of attributes 
characterizing a soul, but these come (by the Sixth Meditation) to be treated in a special category of their own, so 
that Descartes’s account of perception is not straightforwardly dualist.  See John Cottingham, ‘Cartesian 
Trialism’, Mind XCIV, No. 374 (April 1985), 218-230.  The question how straightforwardly dualist Descartes’s 
account of action is comes up in Appendix B. 
 
   
9
 I use ‘souls’ throughout to stand for what Descartes called sometimes ‘esprit’ (or ‘mens’), at other times ‘âme’ 
(or ‘anima’).  We are familiar enough with ‘minds’ used as a façon de parler, supposed to make no commitment to 
non-physical substances, that ‘souls’ serves better to register such commitment. 
 3 
appeal to anything outside the consciousness of the person whose states they are: these are 
attacks on Cartesianism.
10
  Cartesianism is arguably implicit in Descartes’s method, and is 
usually supposed to be secured by substance dualism of Descartes’s sort.  But if charges of 
Cartesianism are still with us today, it seems that Cartesianism cannot actually require 
substance dualism of Descartes’s sort. 
 One can see that contemporary physicalist orthodoxy might not be proof against 
Cartesianism by noticing an ambiguity in ‘substance dualism’.  Substance dualism is often 
understood as the doctrine that mind and body are two different kinds of substance—so that, in 
the terminology being used here to register Descartes’s view, there are souls as well as bodies, 
souls being of a different kind from physical things.
11
  But substance dualism might be 
understood more broadly—as the doctrine that a mind, whatever kind of thing it may be, is a 
substance different from any animal body.  In this broader sense, substance dualism is 
compatible with versions of physicalism.  Indeed any physicalist who tells us that minds are 
brains would seem now to be a substance dualist (no matter what he has to say about states and 
events).
12
  Underlying substance dualism in the broad sense is the idea that those persisting 
things which have mental properties are separable from all such things as lack mental 
properties (no matter whether the things having mental properties are actually physical things).  
This idea does not require souls to be present in the world.  And it may be that some of the 
hostility to Cartesianism is not hostility to souls as such, but is directed towards treatments of 
the mental as a self-standing, inner realm.  One does not automatically escape such treatments 
by adopting the tenets of contemporary physicalist orthodoxy. 
 Two possibilities have emerged here.  First, it may be that one can be anti-Cartesian 
without endorsing any orthodox physicalist doctrine.  Secondly, it may be that some of those 
who go in for orthodox physicalist doctrine are still Cartesian.  I myself think that both of these 
possibilities are actual.  At any rate, you will need to appreciate them both in order to 
understand how it can be that, in resisting the charge that my own account of action lines up 
with Descartes’s, I should avoid endorsing any of the going versions of physicalism. 
 
2:  A very short history of action theory 
We can look at a very truncated history of action theory in order to reveal where questions 
about Cartesianism impinge upon debates about action. 
                                                 
  
10
 By ‘Cartesianism’, I mean a conception of mind which, for instance, has been taken to be the butt of many of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks.  Assuming that a doctrine of substance dualism of Descartes’s kind is to be avoided, I 
want to encourage the thought that some of its errors may actually attach to a Cartesianism which it brings with it, 
and which may attach also to other doctrines. 
 
  
11
 The matter is more complicated than this allows, because Descartes, though he thought that individual souls 
were substances, took individual bodies to be modifications of stuff, not substances proper.  (Those who speak of 
Descartes simply as a mind/matter dualist ignore his different treatments of individuals in the realm of mind and 
individuals in the realm of matter.  And I too ignore them pro hac vice.) 
 
  
12
 I make the assumption here that brains are substances.  In the literature on personal identity, one sometimes 
encounters the claim that persons are brains;  those who advance it do not intend to deny that persons are 
substances (in the relevant sense).  Presumably those who say that minds are brains (who are rather more 
numerous than those who say that persons are brains) do not have their own special understanding of ‘brain’.  And 
we do not need Descartes’s demanding notion of a substance to understand substance dualism in the broad sense 
(or even in the narrow one:  see note 11 supra):  ‘persisting things’ might serve for ‘substances’ here. 
 
 4 
 This should start with Descartes.  We have seen already that he thought that volition is a 
faculty of souls.  Here is what he said about the soul’s production of movements.13 
The soul has its main seat in the little gland which is in the middle of the brain, from where it radiates 
throughout the rest of the body by means of the animal spirits, the nerves, and even the blood ... .  
[T]he machine of the body is made [so that] ... this gland's being moved by the soul drives the 
surrounding spirits into the pores of the brain, which conduct them through the nerves into the 
muscles, by means of which it causes them to move the members [of the body]. 
Only the dualism here needs emphasizing now.  The human body is one thing, a machine 
whose members are caused to move by the muscles which (via the spirits) are driven by the 
gland wherein the soul resides. The soul itself is another thing:  intellectual and volitional 
properties attach to it.  The resulting picture of human action has been called volitionism.  
According to this, when there is an action: 
 
  A soul’s volition IS CAUSALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR a movement of a body 
 
 In order to move to contemporary debate, we need to skip three hundred years.  This takes 
us to recent opposition to volitionism.  The anti-volitionists of the 1950s and 1960s thought it 
an error to suppose that the question ‘What makes a bodily movement voluntary?’ should 
receive a causal answer.
14
  They wanted to avoid the soul and its modes of affecting things;  
and they thought that these could be avoided if causal connections were left out of an account 
of the explanatory relations involved in understanding what people do.  Their opposition to 
volitionism, then, was anti-causalist. 
 In the 1960s, the tide turned.  Donald Davidson’s paper ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’ 
was largely responsible for that.
 15
  Nowadays this paper is read as providing arguments for a 
particular causal thesis, rather than as reacting specifically against the anti-causalism of the 
anti-volitionists.  But situating it by reference to the thinking which prevailed when it was 
written, we can be aware of the care which Davidson took to avoid any events that might have 
been supposed to play the causal role that volitions play in Descartes’s picture.  Davidson 
thought that there is no need for any volitional items in order for causality to have its rightful 
place in an account of action.  (His view was, and is, that beliefs and desires cause actions.
16
)  
Although the anti-causalism which Davidson was reacting against was popular at one time, it is 
not very popular any longer:
17
  our powers as agents surely are powers to change things;  it can 
seem absurd to suppose that we might capture the idea of human agency without treating 
                                                 
  
13
 The Passions of the Soul , ARTICLE 34. 
 
  
14
 This is not a question that Descartes himself ever attempted to answer.  But it is plausible that the attractions 
of a volitionism like Descartes’s may have derived from thinking that having a mental cause could serve to 
distinguish the bodily movements that occur when there is voluntary (or intentional) action from all other bodily 
movements. 
 
  
15
 Journal of Philosophy 60, 1963;  repr. in his op. cit. note 5, 3–19, and in A. Mele (ed.) The Philosophy of 
Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 27–41. 
 
  
16
 I criticized this view in ‘Agency and Causal Explanation’, in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.) Mental Causation 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993);  repr. in The Philosophy of Action, op. cit. note 15, and in my Simple 
Mindedness: A Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1997).  The criticisms leave intact a broadly causal picture of human action by allowing that one can 
provide a causal explanation of what an agent does by saying what her reasons for doing it were.  (Although this 
leaves me opposed to the anti-causalists, I object not only to Davidson’s version, but also to all of the usual 
versions, of causalism:  see §6 infra.) 
 
  
17
 Although it is still defended:  see Michael Morris, in this volume. 
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human beings as part of the causal world within which they operate.  If Davidson showed that 
we can have causation on the scene without volitions there, then he might seem to have put an 
end to the debate about volitionism. 
 There must be more to be said, however.  We can pose questions which are simply not 
addressed in Davidson’s account.  In the first place, there are other concepts than ‘belief’ and 
‘desire’ which apparently have a peculiar relation to action;  and we can ask how those 
concepts fit in.  Secondly, Davidson spoke to the causation of actions, not the causation of the 
bodily movements of Descartes’s picture;  and we can ask about this—about such events as 
arms’ going up, movements of lips, or whatever18.  Action theory of the 1970s and 1980s 
provided accounts which attempted to answer questions of these two sorts, by going into detail 
about the relations between the various events that there are when someone moves her body 
and thereby does something intentionally.  The account I defended myself exploits a 
connection between what is done intentionally by an agent (i.e. what may be explained by 
allusion to what she wants and what she thinks) and what the agent tries to do: 
 
  (T)   She V-d intentionally  –   she tried to V 
 
In the presence of the understanding of an action that we are working with (sc. an event of a 
person’s doing something intentionally), (T) ensures that every action is a person’s trying to do 
something.  Allowing, then, that in the case of physical action, it is because she is trying to do 
something that a person’s body moves, one reaches an account which can be summarized thus: 
 
  A person’s trying to do something is CAUSALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR a movement of  
her body.... 
 
 Evidently this account is readily associated with Descartes’s:  at first blush it might seem 
simply to rename Descartes’s volitions using ‘trying to –—’.  It could appear, then, as if the 
result of filling in a causalist account were to return one to the very volitionism that the anti-
causalists had reacted against.  But I think that this is a false appearance.  And I want to free 
myself from guilt by association.  So I shall defend (T) against charge of Cartesianism (§3).  
And I shall show how superficial the similarity is between Descartes’s account and the one I 
have just summarized (hereafter ‘my account’19). 
                                                 
  
18
 At least it is natural to suppose (ì) that the phrase ‘bodily movements’ subsumes events such as these, and (ii) 
that these events are not actions (where an action is an event of someone’s intentionally doing something).  I used 
to say that ‘bodily movement’ is ambiguous—so that it could mean either (say) the movement of a person’s arm 
or a person’s moving her arm (op. cit. note 2, Ch. 1).  But I now think that I was over-generous to my opponents 
when I suggested that their claim that actions are movements relied upon an ambiguity.  The verb ‘move’ is 
ambiguous, of course—between transitive and intransitive occurrences:  ‘move’ plays different roles in ‘She 
moved her arm’ (where it is a transitive verb) and in ‘Her arm moved’ (where it is intransitive).  But this 
ambiguity appears not to carry over to the nominal ‘movement’.  When a trace of the transitive verb occurs in a 
description of an event, we have (say) ‘a person’s moving her leg’, and it is not evident that the word ‘movement’ 
can serve for this.  If it cannot serve, then it would take a serious argument to show that a hand’s going up (which 
is a bodily movement) is the same event as a person’s raising her hand (which is apparently not a movement).  
Someone equipped with such an argument will say—as Davidson and others do—that actions just are bodily 
movements.  But the arguments seem to me ill-motivated:  see §5 infra. 
 
  
19
 I call it ‘my account’ for the sake of having an easy label for what I defend.  Despite the label, I do not mean 
to suggest either that it originates with me, or that it is the whole of an account of anything.  Brian O’Shaughnessy 
defended something similar in The Will (2 Vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980);  and he and 
others had previously argued for something like (T).  I note that I think that we have to reject some of what 
O’Shaughnessy said in support of the account he gave: see note 23 infra. 
 6 
3:  The import of thesis (T) 
By introducing ‘try to’, (T) brings in antecedents of bodily movements which fall into an 
intuitively mental category.  So my account’s seeming similarity with Descartes’s appears to 
come in through its endorsement of (T).  I need to explain why (T) should not be thought 
responsible for any items’ being conceived of in Descartes’s way. 
 Notice, firstly, that it is not only someone who accepts (T) who might have to guard 
against objections of Cartesianism.  (T) makes a very general claim about what is required to 
do something intentionally.
20
  But even someone who rejects this general claim will surely 
accept that there are occasions when a person moves her body, therein trying to do something 
or other.  On such occasions at least, a movement of a bit of the person’s body arguably 
depends upon her trying to do whatever it is.
21
  Suppose, for example, that someone moves her 
finger against the keyboard trying to type a ‘£’ sign, but because the key has been reassigned 
she actually types an ‘@’.  Her finger’s movement then depends upon her trying to type a ‘£’ 
sign.  If there were objections to the very idea that the movement of a person’s body might 
depend upon her trying to do something, then the objections would apply in this case.  And this 
means that a charge of dualism (if such a charge can really be made) is likely to crop up in 
particular cases even if it is denied that ‘try to’ has the pervasive application which someone 
who endorses (T) believes that it does.  There is really more at stake here than the correctness 
of (T). 
 Notice, secondly, that although we are assuming generally that actions require bodily 
movements, and although (T) makes a very general claim in respect of actions, (T) does not 
make a claim about moving the body.  You might hold that a person moves her body whenever 
there is a physical action of her doing something, and hold (as (T) says) that a person tries to 
do everything she intentionally does.  That does not amount to your holding that people try to 
move their bodies whenever they do something intentionally.  For it might be that people’s 
intentions sometimes take off at points beyond their bodies.  (T) can be acceptable, then, even 
where it is denied that something an agent always does is to try to move her body.  Endorsing 
(T) does not force one to speculate about what it is to move the body. 
 Notice, thirdly, that someone who accepts (T) will think that nearly all of the things that 
agents try to do are things that they actually succeed in doing;  and that even where an agent 
fails to do something that she tries to do, she usually succeeds in doing something (there is 
something else she does—other than what she tries to do).  Thus an ordinary case of someone’s 
trying to do something, whether successful or not, is just an ordinary case of action.  (T) should 
not lead anyone to believe in things called ‘mere tryings’.22 
                                                 
  
20
 (T) is to be read as a schema:  in any instance ‘V’ is to be replaced by a verb, and the tense of the verb at its 
left-hand-side occurrence is to match the tense introduced into the ‘try to’ that occurs before the verb’s infinitive 
occurrence on the right-hand-side. 
 ‘My account’ actually requires only that whenever there is an action, there is at least one thing that the agent 
intentionally does which is something she tries to do (at least one substituend for ‘V’ gives a truth).  My ‘quick 
and simple’ argument (infra) suggests that agents try to do everything they intentionally do;  but this fully general 
claim, which schema (T) catches, actually need not be at issue. 
 
  
21
 An argument would require the distinctness of actions (e.g. her depressing the key marked ‘£’) and bodily 
movements (e.g. her finger’s moving against the key).  Cp. note 18 supra. 
 
  
22
 When ‘tryings’ (simply) are spoken of, people conjure up a picture of ‘mere tryings’:  they forget the adverbial 
characters of ‘try to’.  (See my ‘Reasons for Trying’, Journal of Philosophical Research XX, 1995, 525-539.)  It is 
hard to find a natural terminological policy which enables one both to speak generally and to avoid the misleading 
impression that there might be ‘mere tryings’.  The policy I have adopted here where the context allows is to use 
 7 
 By accepting (T) and a claim about the causal dependence of agents’ effects in the world 
upon events in which agents participate, one arrives at a quite natural account of the difference 
between successful and unsuccessful attempts.  Thus:  someone who tries-to-have-an-effect-
and-succeeds is someone who participates in an event which has some result she intended, 
whereas someone who tries-to-have-an-effect-and-fails is someone who participates in an 
event which doesn’t have some result she intended.  On this account, ‘try to –—’ appears as a 
sort of common denominator, which is present both in intentional doings and in unsuccessful 
tryings.  But those who have their doubts about (T) will wonder why ‘try to’ should be 
supposed to have any application at all when an agent actually does what she means to.  The 
doubters may think that anyone committed to ‘try to’’s having such a pervasive application as 
(T) suggests must have been involved in a search for a common denominator—a sort of search 
which prescinds from the world surrounding the agent and considers only the agent herself and 
how things might have seemed to her.  Well, it is certainly true that philosophers have given 
arguments for (T) in which such considerations are very much to the fore.
23
  But there is a 
quick and simple argument for it which requires no speculations about the phenomenology.  
All that this argument needs is that ‘try to do something’ can be glossed as ‘do what one can to 
do the thing’.  The agent who is influenced by having a reason to do something does what she 
can to do it.  But what one does for a reason, one does intentionally.  And in doing what one 
can to do something, one tries to do it.  So agents try to do what they intentionally do. 
 This argument will be too quick to satisfy.
24
  But my purpose is not to vindicate the 
account I outlined, but only to distance it from Descartes’s.  Suffice it here to say that (T) will 
seem plausible only when it is understood that it can be true that someone tries to do something 
without the fact that she tries to do it being at all a usual or useful thing for anyone to say or to 
think.  Usually, of course, people simply can do the things which they-do-what-they-can to-do.  
Otherwise life would consist mainly of frustrated attempts.  That is why there is usually no 
point in thinking of the person who has done what she set out to do as having done what she 
could.  Certainly there is no need for the agent herself to think of herself as trying to do that 
which (in fact) she tries to do.  So (T) need not be responsible for the musings of those 
philosophers who conceive of ‘tryings’ (as they call them—cp. note 22) exclusively from the 
standpoint of the agent. 
 These points all help to show that (T) is not an accomplice in Cartesianism.  But they do 
not speak directly to the similarity of my account and Descartes’s.  What I shall do next is to 
consider lines of objection which might be thought to have application equally to both 
accounts.  I hope to show that their proper target is Descartes’s account alone (§§4 and 5). 
                                                                                                                                                          
‘try–to’ (rather than just ‘try’) for shorthand, and to use ‘try to –—’ as a sort of schematic verb:  the intention is to 
keep it in mind that to try is always to try to do something. 
 There is a particular case where ‘mere tryings’ have seemed to be in question—the case of an agent who 
tries to do something but actually does nothing.  I discuss this in Appendix A:  On Landry’s Patient. 
 
  
23
 In volume 2 of The Will, O’Shaughnessy announces that a Gricean argument supports the claim about ‘trying 
to’ which he and I accept.  But he proceeds to give (among others) an argument from illusion, whose tenor is 
certainly Cartesian.  Suffice it here to say that I do no think a defence of (T) (still less of the weaker claim which 
is really at issue:  see note 20 supra) need advert to ‘trying to do seeming Ø’, or take a view on the 
‘epistemological status of bodily tryings’.  A properly Gricean argument can certainly be much simpler than 
O’Shaughnessy’s argument from illusion:  see note 24 infra. 
 
  
24
 A Gricean argument which I stated in my op. cit. note 2, 34–5 (which is an argument from ignorance, rather 
than an argument from illusion) also seeks to show that the background facts which conduce to an instance of 
‘She V-d intentionally’ suffice for the truth of the relevant instance of ‘She tried to V’. 
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4:  A mysterious gulf? 
In Gilbert Ryle’s description of Descartes’s account, ‘mental thrusts, which are not movements 
of matter in space, can cause muscles to contract’;  and mental thrusts work ‘in some way, 
which must remain forever mysterious’.25  Ryle is one of the anti-causalist anti-volitionists.  
He wanted to know how something purely mental could have a causal influence in the material 
world where muscles contract.  How is the gulf between mind and matter bridged? 
 Descartes for his part saw no problem here.  He once said ‘if “corporeal” is taken to mean 
anything that can in anyway affect a body, then mind too must be called “corporeal” in this 
sense’.26  Of course, we are unlikely to be much impressed by this:  a philosopher who tells us, 
as Descartes did, that the properties of thought and of extension are mutually incompatible can 
hardly be entitled to claim that there is any sense in which a thinking thing ‘must be called 
“corporeal”’.  But the possibility of using the claim in response to Ryle shows that an objection 
of ‘mental thrusts’ on its own is only as powerful as the very familiar general objection to 
Descartes’s sort of substance dualism—the objection which says that souls, being of a different 
kind from physical things, are alien to the world of causes and effects. 
 Descartes hoped that his detractors might be persuaded to stop thinking of volitions as 
alien to movements by constructing a category, the ‘corporeal’, to which volitions and 
movements both belong.  Evidently an analogous step could be taken in respect of my account 
if it seemed to need defence.  In order to demonstrate that there is a category to which events of 
trying–to and movements both belong, one could say that an event of a person’s trying to do 
something is, in some sense, physical.  That would be enough to put any version of the familiar 
general objection to Descartes to rest.  But Ryle’s objection is actually more powerful than this 
allows.  To see this, imagine someone who says that she can only conceive of electrochemical 
impulses as ‘thrusts’, and that she is puzzled about how their causing muscles to contract could 
illuminate human action.  No doubt one sort of difficulty is alleviated if she is brought to see 
that there is a level of physical description which subsumes both the electrochemical and the 
mechanical.  But even when the operation of neural transmission is made to seem 
unmysterious to her, she is not helped in understanding what a person’s intentionally doing 
something consists in.  If you hope to be better placed to understand those powers of persons 
which allow them to get things done by moving their bodies, then you would seem to be no 
better served by an account of neural transmission than by an account of a gland’s being 
moved by a soul. 
 Descartes’s elaborate story (quoted above, invoking the animal spirits) is presumably 
meant to help us to understand the rational soul’s active powers.  The problem which Descartes 
faces and which could never be solved by calling the soul corporeal begins to emerge when we 
consider that story.  In order for the soul’s action to be found intelligible, the goings on around 
the pineal gland must be related to an understanding of human agency.  The soul is a rational 
being, having intentional states.  So we can ask Descartes:  What does it will?  The answer to 
this cannot be that the pineal gland moves.  For a rational soul need not concern itself with the 
gland (just as ordinary active people need not concern themselves with neural transmission).  It 
must be, then, that a soul is supposed to will (say) that a finger moves.  But in that case the 
soul seems to have a magical power—the sort of power that we should attribute to a person if 
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 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), 62. 
 
  
26
 Letter to Hyperaspites, August 1641, at 112 in Descartes’ Philosophical Letters, tr. and ed. Anthony Kenny 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970). 
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we could believe that she could directly move something remote from her. This is why 
Descartes’s account of ordinary physical agency has been said to involve psychokinesis.27  The 
only thing that a soul can move directly is the pineal gland.  But we can understand a rational 
being’s capacity to move x indirectly, only by thinking of it as having knowledge of how x can 
be affected by something that it can move directly.
28
  The trouble then is that souls do not have 
knowledge of how glands have to be affected for body parts to move, so that we lack any 
understanding of how something placed as the Cartesian soul is could be in a position to move 
(say) the little finger of a certain body.  This remains, as Ryle said, ‘forever mysterious’. 
 The mystery here is created by the situation of the soul, and is independent of its non-
physical nature. And my own account would introduce a mystery if ‘try to –—’ were taken to 
apply to something that lacks capacities for movement.  But there is no possible basis for 
supposing that ‘try to –—’ could apply to something lacking such capacities.29  When accounts 
like mine are described, one often finds that ‘try to –—’ is applied to nothing:  philosophers 
often speak simply of ‘tryings’—as if these might be unowned and (as it were) free-floating 
events.  But of course what has to be meant by ‘a trying’, in any particular case, is someone’s 
trying to do some particular thing.  In my account, then, there is a place for things to which we 
actually predicate ‘try to ——’.  Such things are human beings, whom we can readily conceive 
as having capacities to move their bodies.  In order to conceive of them thus, we have only to 
think of ourselves, and to hold fast to the truth that there are no souls that our selves are. 
 Whereas human agents are lost sight of in Descartes’s picture of human action, they 
feature in mine.  One can think that a person’s action requires an event of her trying to do 
something without thinking of the person as composed from a proper part which tries.  The 
claim that a person’s trying to do something is distinct from her body’s moving does not 
involve one in the idea that a person can be decomposed into a thing that tries and a body. 
 
5:  A Mysterious Inner Realm? 
A different sort of Cartesian malady has been thought to afflict my account.  The allegation is 
not that I am involved in a distinction between mental and physical substances, but that I am 
involved nonetheless in a distinction which was bound to be present in Descartes, given his 
separating of souls from bodies.  The distinction now is between a mental realm—wherein 
events of people trying to do things, or of souls’ willing things may be supposed to occur—, 
and a physical realm—wherein bodies move.  In consequence of my holding that an agent’s 
trying to do something results in a bit of her body’s moving, it has been said that I am (i) 
Cartesian, and (ii) ‘a mental action theorist’;  and it has been said that, on my account of them, 
actions (a) are not ‘overt’, (b) are identified with ‘purely mental acts of will’, and (c) have their 
‘essence located in the will’.30  The critics who say these things recognize that even when 
                                                 
  
27
 See Bernard Williams, Descartes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), 288–292. 
 
  
28
 To use the terminology of basicness:  everything an agent has it in her power to do is either something basic, 
or requires knowledge of how non-basic things can be done by doing basic ones.  The relevant notion of basicness 
here is a teleological one:  see my op. cit. note 2, Ch. 6.  (I put the matter slightly differently from Williams [op. 
cit. note 27], thinking as I do that a teleological notion of basicness is different from a causal one.) 
 
  
29
 In my op. cit. note 2, I claimed that ‘actions [and thus events of trying–to] occur insider the body’.  The claim 
is misleading at best.  But notice now that the idea was never that there is something insider the body to which 
predications of ‘trying to –—’ attach.  And see further the end of Appendix A infra. 
 
  
30
 See (í) R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability:  Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1990);  (ii) Myles Brand, Intending and Acting:  Towards a Naturalized Action Theory 
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persons are not problematically decomposed, the phenomenon of agency may still be.  (Even 
where substance dualism is absent, Cartesian thinking may still be present—as we saw in §1.)  
Certainly, if these things were true, there would be more of an affinity between Descartes’s 
account and mine than I have just allowed. 
. In fact the allegations bring to light a difference between Descartes and me.  I say that a 
person’s trying to do something is an action (is her doing something that she does 
intentionally),
31
 whereas Descartes does not say that a soul’s volition is an action.  There is 
thus no question on my account, as there is on Descartes’s, of an action’s being ‘partly in the 
mental realm’, ‘partly in the physical’.32  Still, this difference by itself will not impress the 
critics.  For they think that a problem is exposed in my account as soon as a distinction 
between mental and physical is registered there.  ‘Even if actions themselves do not straddle 
the mental/physical divide,’ they may say, ‘it is objectionable that an account of action should 
straddle it.  And as for actions themselves, these should be located firmly in the physical realm, 
not a mysterious inner one.’ 
 To get to the bottom of the objections envisaged here, we need to know why a claim of 
identities of actions with events of trying–to should be thought to make actions ‘mental’ and to 
place them beyond what is ‘overt’.  Suppose that you accept such identities—you accept, say, 
that her hitting the ball into the net was her trying to make a winning shot.  Will you be led to 
say that her action of hitting the ball into the net must really be mental (seeing that it is 
describable using the word ‘try’)?  Would you not rather say that her trying to make a winning 
shot must be physical (seeing that it is describable using the word ‘hit’)?  You might equally 
well say either of these things.  The claim of an identity of a putatively mental item (a person’s 
trying to do something) with a putatively physical one (an action) might just as well be taken to 
reveal the physical character of the putatively mental item as the mental character of the 
putatively physical one. 
 The objections can now be seen to rely upon the idea that a distinction between mental and 
physical corresponds to an actual division in the spatiotemporal world.  If there were such a 
division, then no doubt one would be obliged to answer questions about which side of it 
actions, events of trying–to, and bodily movements fall on.  But an event describable using 
both a piece of mental vocabulary (‘try to –—’) and a piece of physical vocabulary (‘hitting’), 
since it can equally well be said either to be mental or to be physical, might perfectly well be 
said to be both mental and physical.  So the question ‘Mental OR physical?’ has to be refused.  
The distinction between mental and physical does not partition the events that there are.  And 
the assumption that there are boundaries in space between mental events and physical events 
                                                                                                                                                          
(Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1984), and Michael Moore, Act and Crime:  The Philosophy of Action and its 
Implications for Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993);  (a) Brand (op. cit.);  (b) Bill Brewer, 
‘The Integration of Spatial Vision and Action’, in Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen McCarthy and Bill Brewer (eds.), 
Spatial Representation, 294-316 (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993).  (c) Duff, op. cit. 
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 If there are cases in which a person tries in vain to move a part of her body, then the claim here is not a 
universal one.  For present purposes, it makes no odds whether one accepts that there are such cases:  the claim 
might be that where someone tries to do something and thereby intentionally does something, her trying to do the 
thing is her doing it.  I discuss vain attempts to move the body in Appendix A. 
 
  
32
 Descartes might have said that a volition is part of an action, the other part being a bodily movement.  Not 
talking the explicit event language, Descartes did not in fact address questions about parthood.  But some 
contemporary philosophers are explicit about actions having both mental and physical proper parts, taking this to 
be a sine qua non of action’s psychophysical character. 
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must be rejected. Once the split between soul and body has been renounced, there is no real 
divide for an account of action to straddle. 
 If an assumption of a spatial mental/physical divide is made, then denying that actions are 
bodily movements appears to exclude them from the physical world.  If an action is not a 
bodily movement but is someone’s trying to do something, then, thinking of it with the 
putative divide in place, one conceives of it as hidden from view, as something which 
somehow initiates movements of a body.  Actions then belong to a mysterious inner realm, 
separate from the outer realm inhabited by people’s bodies.  But when the assumption is 
rejected, there is no reason to think that actions belong anywhere in a picture containing the 
putative divide. 
 Recognizing the identity of actions with events of trying–to helps to show (as we saw) that 
an intuitive distinction between mental and physical is inimical to such a divide.  Refusing the 
identity of actions with bodily movements (we can now see) cannot create the mysterious 
realm which the divide introduces.  For suppose that one really did have to say that actions, 
being causally anterior to bodily movements, must take up residence in a mysterious inner 
realm.  Would it not then be in exactly such a realm that beliefs and desires were located by 
theorists who identify actions with bodily movements and who say that actions are caused by 
beliefs and desires?  (Presumably beliefs and desires would be supposed to fall on the mental 
side of any mental/physical divide.)  It is true that such theorists usually claim that the beliefs 
and desires which they take to cause actions are components of the same natural world as the 
physical things which they take all movements to be.  But they are not entitled to such a claim 
if there is a problem with the idea that exercises of our powers as agents can be revealed in the 
items alongside which bodily movements are classified when the putative mental/physical 
divide does its work. 
 There is a genuine difficulty about bringing events which are the doings of sentient beings 
who do things for reasons into relation with events conceived as on the farther side of a 
mental/physical divide.  And bodily movements are often thought of as belonging on the 
farther side by philosophers:  the claim that actions are bodily movements is often glossed as 
the claim that they are ‘mere movements of the body’, or that they are ‘no more than bodily 
movements’.33  Bodily movements then come to be assimilated to items which might be there 
even if there were no persons whose bodies they were movements of.  It is this assimilation, 
rather than anything in my account, which is the source of the genuine difficulty.  If a difficulty 
sprang simply from denying that actions can be identified with bodily movements, then we 
should expect it to go away as soon as the identity was asserted.  But in the presence of the 
difficulty, the step of identifying actions with bodily movements seems like subterfuge.  The 
problem is to understand how a person’s role in getting done the things that she does for 
reasons could be a matter of her operating on inanimate nature.  The problem cannot be made 
to go away by declaring that an action (a person’s doing whatever it is when she does 
something for a reason) is itself the operation of inanimate nature. 
 A typical action theorist of today sees no problem at this point.  Just as Descartes was 
content to call souls corporeal ‘in a sense’, in order to ensure that we should not have to think 
of causal transactions across alien kinds, so a typical action theorist of today is content with a 
homogeneous conception of those events which occupy the spatiotemporal world and 
participate there in causal relations.  (Such a conception informs orthodox physicalism, as we 
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 See Davidson, op. cit. note 5, at 59 in reprinted version;  and Moore, op. cit. note 30, at 83, who announces 
that ‘actions are no more than bodily movements’ is a ‘reductive’ thesis. 
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shall see.)  But perhaps even a typical action theorist has an inchoate sense of the problem.  At 
least if he does, that would explain why it should be thought that distinguishing actions from 
bodily movements is tantamount to relegating actions to a mysterious inner realm (or to 
denying that they are ‘overt’, or to locating ‘their essence in the will’). 
 The problem (to repeat) arises from supposing that the bodily movements that there are 
when there are actions might be located in a world bereft of beings who do things for 
reasons—a world where so-called ‘mere movements of bodies’ belong.  The supposition 
prevents one from treating movements in such a way that they can be rightly related to the 
agents who produce them. (And it makes no difference to this whether or not one says that 
bodily movements are the same as actions.)  Those who make the supposition may see a point, 
as Descartes did, in calling a human body ‘a machine’.  They may forget that Descartes can be 
faulted for his assumption that corporeal substance excludes the features of thinking beings as 
much as for his more familiar assumption that the bearers of mental properties are not the sort 
of things to which physical properties attach.
34
 
 Ryle’s objection to Descartes was that souls cannot be rightly related to what they are 
supposed to act upon.  I said that the Rylean objection can be seen not to touch my account 
once it is allowed that a human being is not detachable from an event which is her trying to do 
something.  In allowing this, one rejects a Cartesian conception of people’s possession of 
(intuitively) mental properties.  What I say now is that the objection of a mysterious inner 
realm will present itself unless it is allowed that human beings are the bodily beings they are, 
and that the movements which they make are theirs.  In allowing this, one rejects a Cartesian 
conception of people’s possession of (intuitively) physical properties. 
 
6:  Mental Causation:  Dualism and Physicalism in Action 
I hope to have shown that there are no Cartesian assumptions in my account of action (§3), and 
that if there seem to be, that is because others read them in to it (§5).  I want to suggest in 
conclusion that it is actually the orthodox physicalists’ treatment of action, not mine, which 
lines up with Descartes’s. 
 The similarity of my account to Descartes’s is partly to be blamed on their common focus 
of attention—on the agent’s body.  But notice that there are different reasons for this narrow 
focus.  The reason for the apparent shortsightedness of my own account is simply a desire to 
generalize.  If one hopes to say anything general about physical action, it is no good having 
one’s sights on the world surrounding agents, because there are so many things of such various 
sorts that agents do.  The thread running through them all is that the agent has to move to do 
them, and that is how the focus comes to be turned towards the agent’s body.  (The outlook of 
my own account is actually broader than the narrow focus suggests, because the things that 
agents can try to do are as many and various as the things they do.
35
 The point emerged in §3:  
my account does not deal only with people moving their bodies, but speaks also to all the more 
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 Descartes’s belief in souls is normally thought of as arrived at through the introspective route he took in the 
Meditations.  But part of his reason for attaching mental properties to a soul was a difficulty he thought he saw 
about attaching them to a substance whose principles of operation are purely mechanistic.  See ‘Descartes, Rorty 
and the Mind-Body Fiction’, repr. in Simple Mindedness, op. cit. note 16, 24-41. 
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 There are plenty of substitutes for ‘something’ in ‘the agent’s trying to do something’, plenty of verbs besides 
‘move the body’ which can replace ‘V’ in (T);  and (T) introduces the agent’s trying to do any of the things which 
she does intentionally. 
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interesting things that they do.)  In Descartes’s account, attention to the agent’s body has a 
different rationale.  When the soul has been introduced, we are owed some account of its 
doings;  and given the soul’s situation, the close-up story of the production of movements is 
bound to be told.  Descartes cannot simply acknowledge, as I do, a kind of being that has basic 
capacities of movement. 
 But here the similarity, such as it is, shows up.  Although I acknowledge that human 
beings have capacities of movement, I nevertheless discern a sort of causal complexity in 
exercises of those capacities.  Human beings are complex beings;  some of the events in which 
they participate depend causally upon others.  The dependencies in the case of action, are 
dependencies of movements of parts of agents’ bodies upon events of their trying to do things.  
So I think, as Descartes does, that when there is an action, a movement of the agent’s body can 
be seen to depend causally upon something which is (intuitively) mental. 
 This may be put in slightly different terms:  both Descartes and I think that action involves 
‘mental causation’.  Put in these terms, what I have been trying to establish, in order to show 
that the similarity does not go deep, is how very differently Descartes and I treat ‘mental 
causation’.  Since nearly everyone accepts that action involves ‘mental causation’, what 
distinguishes Descartes from me is something of which nearly everyone must take a view.
36
  
‘Mental causation’ has been of great concern recently, especially among orthodox 
physicalists.
37
 
 None of the claims of orthodox physicalism was required to avoid Ryle’s objection of a 
mysterious gulf.  We saw that this objection is avoided by insisting on the sameness of that 
which tries to do something and that whose parts it can move.  The movements which are 
caught up in the understanding of such a thing—of a human being—are then individuated as 
events in which someone’s participation is crucial, and not as the subject matter of physics or 
of any other science.  Bodily movements are physical of course.  But the sense of ‘physical’ in 
which it is obvious that they are physical is not that which has informed the recent debate on 
‘mental causation’. 
 Most contemporary philosophers think that physicalism requires one to be able to see the 
mental’s causal operation as an example of the world’s working causally in such a way as to 
reflect its law-like workings.  Their treatments of ‘mental causation’ encourage one to take the 
close-up view of the agent which Descartes took.  They may say that events of trying–to, if 
they are causally responsible for movements of bodies, are, or are constituted by, ‘brain 
events’.  But an objection of Cartesianism arises however this is interpreted. 
 If a brain event is something in which a brain participates, then the orthodox physicalist 
tells us that the causal transitions involved in human action are transitions between brain and 
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 I say ‘nearly everyone’ to allow for the anti-causalists (see §2 supra).  The treatment of mental causation is a 
question for all causalists.  It might seem that there is a special question for Descartes and me, because we accept, 
what many don’t, that the agent’s body is a locus of ‘mental causation’.  (Many think that one has to look to 
actions’ antecedents—to what occurs before anything bodily—in order to find anything which is both 
psychologically describable and causally operative.)  Still, we saw in §3 that even someone who rejects my 
general claims about action may accept that there are occasions when a person moves her body therein trying to 
do something.  So perhaps nearly everyone accepts that the agent’s body is sometimes a locus of mental 
causation.  That would ensure that there is in fact no special question for Descartes and me.  But however this may 
be, nearly everyone allows that there is ‘mental causation’. 
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to persons’ causal complexity as marking out any kind of causation:  see note 40 infra. 
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body.  In that case he accepts a version of substance dualism in the broad sense identified in 
§1.  We saw in §4 that the principal objection to Descartes does not actually depend upon the 
nature of the soul;  and this means that if one thinks of a person’s trying to do something as the 
brain’s doing something, one renders physical action mysterious as Descartes did.  There is a 
kind of causal dependence encountered when effects are produced by a being with contentful 
states (a being that can will something, or try to do something);  and this kind of dependence is 
not found intelligible when causal properties are attributed to something located inside a body. 
 The other possibility is that calling something a brain event is a matter of locating it in the 
domain of neurophysiology (rather than of thinking of it specifically as the brain’s doing 
something).  Brain events in this case are among the flux of events in nature, unowned and 
free-floating, as it were;  and the causal connections which are examples of ‘mental causation’ 
are discoverable without finding something to which ‘try to ——’ can be predicated.  But this 
is equally problematic.  We have seen that the items of Descartes’s story—the volitions which 
belong to souls, and the movements which belong to mind-excluding substances—are foreign 
to a proper account of physical action.  Equally foreign must be the unowned and free floating 
events.  For the underlying difficulty is to think about the production of bodily movements as 
human action even when the causes of those movements are supposed to be identifiable 
without making reference to any bodily being.  If one takes bodily movements to be robust 
presences ‘in the physical world’, then, in searching for their antecedents with the agent 
removed from the scene, one thinks of inner items, and then one may conjure up an inner realm 
for those items to inhabit.  Here a Cartesian difficulty stems from attempting to find what are 
actually changes in a rational being inside a world which one had hoped to conceive of as 
physical in some exacting sense.  The orthodox physicalist, in avoiding the mysterious gulf, 
puts herself under pressure to introduce the spurious divide between mental and physical.
38
 
 The problem here, for the orthodox physicalist, is the one we saw in §5—about 
understanding how causal transactions in inanimate nature could account for a person’s role in 
getting done the things that she does for reasons.  Causal dependencies which reflect the causal 
complexity of a human being are not examples of the world’s working causally in such a way 
as to reflect its law-like workings.  The phenomenon of ‘mental causation’, in which human 
beings show up as causally complex beings, cannot consist in pairs of particulars standing in a 
relation of causation as this is typically conceptualized by philosophers.
39
  So the dependencies 
encountered in human agency are not the ‘physical causation’ to which orthodox physicalists 
have wanted to assimilate ‘mental causation’.40 
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 Cp. John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), at 90.  Put in the 
terms that McDowell takes from Sellars, what the present paper argues is that human physical action is situated in 
the space of reasons, where the space of reasons is to be contrasted not with the space of causes but with 
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 For reasons to reject the typical conceptualization, see Helen Steward’s arguments against what she calls the 
network model of causation in her Ontology of Mind:  Events, States and Processes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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 In ‘The Mental Causation Debate’, Aristotelian Society Supp.Vol. 69 (1995), 211-236, Tim Crane argues that 
the dominant contemporary versions of physicalism implicitly reject the assumption of ‘homogeneity’—the 
assumption ‘that mental and physical causation are the same kind of relation’.  It seems then that I am on the side 
of contemporary physicalists in my treatment of mental causation.  Well, I am more than happy to acknowledge 
Crane’s point that there is a homogeneity assumption which provokes contemporary physicalist treatments of 
mental causation but which they find themselves forced to abandon. (I take their abandonment of the assumption 
to be symptomatic of a problem which is inherent in the orthodoxy and which I have tried to expose here.)  But it 
would be an oversimplification of my own view to say that mental and physical causation are different kinds of 
 15 
 We saw in §1 that someone might be anti-Cartesian without endorsing any orthodox 
physicalist doctrine, and that someone might be a Cartesian orthodox physicalist.  What we see 
now is that endorsing physicalist doctrine is actually just a way of being Cartesian.  Orthodox 
physicalism’s attitude to causation is a source of Cartesian thinking. 
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relation.  It is rather that we have to stop thinking that all causation can be understood by reference to the going 
model of ‘physical causation’  (cp. Steward, op. cit. note 39, and my ‘Causation in Intuitive Physics and in 
Commonsense Psychology’, in op. cit. note 16, 185–194);  and that we have to allow for the species of 
intelligibility that is peculiar to rational sentient beings. 
 I should note that my arguments here—about treating events of trying–to as brain events—are directly 
addressed to a version of physicalism which does not flout the homogeneity assumption as Crane sets things up.  
But when I say that it is part of the orthodoxy that  one must be able to see the mental’s causal operation as an 
example of the world’s working causally in such a way as to reflect its law-like workings, I intend to speak to 
other versions of physicalism, including what Crane calls ‘the constitution view’. 
 I thank Paul Boghossian, David Papineau, Scott Sturgeon, and (especially) Tim Crane (who prompted me to 
re-read his op. cit.) for questions asked after the lecture on which this paper is based. 
APPENDIX A:  On Landry’s Patient 
 In defending (T) against charges of Cartesianism, I pointed out that a person’s trying to do 
something can usually be identified with an action.  But if there are cases in which a person tries in vain 
to move a part of her body, then a person can try to do something without there being an action of hers.  
It has been thought objectionable that I should allow such cases.  Bill Brewer puts an objection to my 
account of action, saying  that ‘the subject is distanced from movement in her body in such a way as to 
threaten her status as agent’ (op. cit. note 30, at 306). 
 The case to which Brewer and others speak is the case of Landry’s patient.  The patient had lost all 
sensation in one arm.  When his eyes were closed, he was told to raise his arm;  unknown to him, his 
arm was held down—it was prevented from rising;  and when he opened his eyes, he was surprised to 
find that it had not risen.  It seems natural to say that, although he didn’t raise his arm, he tried to. 
 It may be that in contemplating Landry’s patient, one starts to think in phenomenological terms 
about events describable using the word ‘try’:  one thinks that it must have seemed to the patient just as 
it would have seemed if he had moved his arm (if the arm, in which he had no sensation, had not been 
prevented from rising);  and then one may start to think of events of trying to do things under the aspect 
of seemings.  But in fact one does not need to focus on the phenomenology to judge that the patient tried 
to move his arm.  The judgment might be based on knowledge that he is obedient to instructions:  
obedient as he is, he does what he can to raise his arm when told to do so;  and his belief that he has 
raised his arm, evinced in his surprise that it had not moved, is then a further piece of evidence that he 
tried to raise it. 
 It is not that we should necessarily go wrong if we considered how things seemed to the patient.  
But there is no reason to think that we must be working with some purely phenomenological notion 
when we think of Landry’s patient as having tried to raise his arm.  And of course it cannot be right 
generally to think about events of trying–to as seemings.  (We could not have acquired the concept of 
trying to if we had had only phenomenology to work with.)  We must not forget what an extraordinary 
epistemic and practical situation Landry’s patient was in:  he was not allowed to see;  he was 
proprioceptively incapacitated;  and his movements were obstructed.  We can agree with Brewer that 
‘his status as agent is threatened’.  Thoughts that we have about his case cannot be expected to 
generalize to other cases.  Landry’s patient’s failed attempt is at least as unsuited to providing a model 
for action as the case of a false belief is unsuited to providing a model for knowledge. 
 Still if we do accept that Landry’s patient did try to move his arm, then the account I gave in §3, of 
the difference between successful and unsuccessful attempts, applies in this case.  Thus:  a person’s 
trying to raise her arm is her raising it if is it causally responsible for her arm’s rising, but is her 
unsuccessfully trying to raise it if no event of her arm’s rising ensues.  It is this to which Brewer really 
objects.  Brewer wants to be able to say that someone’s unsuccessfully trying to raise her arm is of a 
fundamentally different kind from her raising it. And he suggests that we need a ‘disjunctive conception 
of tryings’.  The trouble is that a disjunctive conception of tryings seems quite implausible in general.  
Remember the case of the typist who typed an ‘@’ sign when the key had been reassigned.  Is her 
moving her finger against the keyboard of a fundamentally different kind from the kind it is of when the 
key has not been reassigned and she actually types a ‘£’ sign?  Surely not. 
 I believe that it is a disjunctive conception of bodily movements, not of events of trying to, that we 
need if we want, as Brewer and I both do, to keep the subject in touch with movements of her body.  
(Such a conception is implicit in what I have said at §5 and echoed in §6 supra , and it is explicit in my 
‘Postscript’ to ‘Bodily Movements, Actions and Epistemology’, in Simple Mindedness, op. cit. note 16, 
102–110.) 
 Landry’s patient’s case was one of the things that encouraged me to say (as I did once upon a time, 
cp. note 29 supra) that actions occur inside the body.  That claim, though misleading at best, need not be 
Cartesian, because it could be that predications belong properly to a whole substance, even where the 
events whose occurrence actually makes those predications true are locatable in a volume smaller than 
the whole substance.  Consider:  when I varnish the table, the event of its coming to be shiny is plausibly 
located at the surface of the table, even though being shiny is a property that the table comes to have.  
(This is only analogous in some respects of course.  And one will not see the point in such an analogy 
until one has rid oneself of the orthodox physicalists’ way of thinking about causation.) 
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APPENDIX B:  On Descartes’ Dualism 
The distinction I made in §1, between dualism and Cartesianism, is different from the distinction Baker 
and Morris make between Descartes’s dualism and Cartesian dualism (op. cit. note 1).  ‘Cartesian 
dualism’ in the sense of Baker and Morris is certainly Cartesian;  the argument of their book is that 
Descartes did not hold the doctrine known as, and criticized as, Cartesian dualism.  Here I make some 
remarks about how Baker and Morris’s challenge to the nowadays usual reading of Descartes might 
affect what I say. 
 Baker and Morris’s distinction shows that we can understand ‘Cartesianism’ if we know only the 
recent secondary literature.  And for the argument of my paper, it would not matter if no-one actually 
held the views I attribute to Descartes (so long as they are wrong, and they line up more with orthodox 
physicalists’ views than with mine).  But I am inclined to think that the historical Descartes actually has 
slightly more in common with the Descartes to whom I attribute views than Baker and Morris would 
allow. 
 Part of Baker and Morris’s attack on the idea that Descartes was a Cartesian dualist is their claim 
that he was neither a volitionist, nor an interactionist (in the senses usually meant).  They suggest that 
the view ‘that voluntary action is to be analyzed in terms of volitions that are efficient causes of bodily 
movements’ is ascribed to Descartes without any grounds.  There are three things here of which 
Descartes’s present-day expositor might be guilty:  (a) crediting Descartes with analytical ambitions, (b) 
assuming that the volitions of which Descartes spoke are (to put it in my terms) unowned and free 
floating events, (c) assuming that Descartes held that ‘cause’ relates volitions and movements.  On (a):  I 
have not said that Descartes attempted to analyze voluntary action (see note 14 supra).  On (b):  I have 
been careful (as Ryle perhaps was not) to see the volitions of which Descartes speaks as some soul’s 
volitions.  On (c):  I have deliberately used ‘is causally responsible for’ (which I take to be more open-
ended than ‘causes’) in my statement of Descartes’s account.  I acknowledge that there is much more to 
be said on the subject of Descartes and causation, and that most expositors say very little.  But I do not 
think that there can be any doubt that Descartes took his dualism to be the upshot of a correct 
understanding of causal transactions in the physical world (as I contended as the end of §5).  That does 
not establish that Descartes was an interactionist, rather than an occasionalist.  (And Baker and Morris 
endorse Russell’s claim [which certainly seems sustainable] that occasionalism is derivable from 
premises in Descartes.)  But the question for Descartes—about how to accommodate human action in a 
world of bodies as he conceived them—remains, whether or not, in giving his own answer to it, 
Descartes resisted a crude interactionism and plumped for occasionalism. 
 Baker and Morris say that Descartes simply conceded that ‘there could be no intelligible 
connection between soul and body’ (56, their italics).  Well, presumably if Descartes was an 
occasionalist, then he might have allowed that a connection between the two was intelligible to God.  
And even if, as Baker and Morris say, Descartes did not expect us to understand soul/body transitions, 
we find Descartes trying to make them less unintelligible to us, e.g. when he says that the soul might be 
called corporeal.  If Descartes had not been at all inclined to make any attempt to find the connection 
intelligible, then we should not expect to find the Passions passage (quoted in §2 supra), which contains 
the close-up story.  In any case, the stock criticism of Descartes, on which I rely, says only that the 
connection is not intelligible to a follower of Descartes’s.  (Here again there is much more to be said—
now under the head of ‘the substantial union of soul and body’.)  
 What I call volitionism can probably be attributed to Descartes simply on the basis of the passage I 
quoted.  To the extent to which it can be shown to be doubtful that he held that account, Descartes was a 
less consistent philosopher of mind—albeit it a more interesting one—than is commonly supposed. 
